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Abstract. Consider a system in which players at nodes of an underlying
graph G repeatedly play Prisoner’s Dilemma against their neighbors.
The players adapt their strategies based on the past behavior of their
opponents by applying the so-called win-stay lose-shift strategy. This
dynamics has been studied in [Kit94,DGG+02,MR06].
With random scheduling, starting from any initial configuration with
high probability the system reaches the unique fixed point in which all
players cooperate. This paper investigates the validity of this result under
various classes of adversarial schedulers. Our results can be summarized
as follows:
– An adversarial scheduler that can select both participants to the
game can preclude the system from reaching the unique fixed point
on most graph topologies.
– A nonadaptive scheduler that is only allowed to choose one of the
participants is no more powerful than a random scheduler. With
this restriction even an adaptive scheduler is not significantly more
powerful than the random scheduler, provided it is “reasonably fair”.
The results exemplify the adversarial scheduling approach we propose as
a foundational basis for the generative approach to social science [Eps07].
Keywords: evolutionary games, self stabilization, discrete dynamical sys-
tems, adversarial analysis
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory [Wei95] and agent-based simulation in the social sci-
ences [BW00,TJ06,GT05] share the object of study and a significant set of con-
cerns, and are largely distinguished only by the method of choice (mathematical
reasoning versus computational experiments). In particular, the two areas deal
with fairly similar models (see, e.g. [Wil06,BEM05]). A particular class of such
models assumes a large population of agents located at the vertices of a graph.
⋆ corresponding author. Email: gabrielistrate@acm.org
Agents interact by playing a fixed game, and update their behavior based on the
outcome of this interaction (according to a pre-specified rule).
How does one interpret properties of such systems, be they obtained through
mathematical analysis or computational simulations ? A possible answer is that
results characterizing dynamical properties of such models provide insights (and
possible explanations) for features observed in “real-world” social dynamics. For
instance, the primary intuition behind the concept of stochastically stable strate-
gies in evolutionary game theory is that a small amount of “noise” (or, equiva-
lently, small deviations from rationality) in game dynamics can solve the equi-
librium selection problem, by focusing the system on one particular equilibrium.
Similarly, in agent-based social theory, Epstein [Eps07,Eps99] (see also [AE96])
has advocated a generative approach to social science. The goal is to explain a
given social phenomenon by generating it using multiagent simulations4. Related
concerns have been recently voiced throughout analytical social science, with a
particular emphasis on mechanism-based explanations [Hed05,HS06].
Given that game theory and agent-based simulation are emerging as tools
for guiding political decision-making (see e.g. [BEM05,ECC+04,EGK+04,TRA]),
it is important to make sure that the conclusions that we derive from these
techniques are robust to small variations in model specification5.
In this paper we consider the effect of one particular factor that can affect the
robustness of results of agent-based simulations and evolutionary game theory:
agent scheduling, i.e. the order in which agents get to update their strategies.
Many models in the literature assume one of two popular alternatives:
– synchronous update: every player can update at every moment (in either
discrete or continuous time); this is the model implicitly used by “large
population” models in evolutionary game theory.
– uniform matching: agents are vertices of a (hyper)graph. At each step we
choose a (hyper)edge uniformly at random and all players corresponding to
this hyperedge are updated using the local update function.
Instead of postulating one of these two update mechanisms, we advocate
the study of social dynamics under an approach we call adversarial scheduling.
We exemplify adversarial scheduling by studying, in such a setting, the Iterated
Prisoners’ Dilemma game with win-stay lose-shift strategy. This dynamics (orig-
inally motivated by the colearning model in [ST94]) have received substantial
attention in the game-theoretic literature[Kit94,DGG+02,MR06].
We are, of course, far from being the first researchers to recognize the cru-
cial role of scheduling/activation order on the properties of social dynamics (to
4 cf. [Eps07], Chapter 1: “if you didn’t grow it [the social phenomenon, n.n.], you
didn’t explain its emergence”.
5 The importance of stability has been previously recognized in the literature, for in-
stance, in [AE96] (pp. 35), where emergent phenomena are defined as “stable macro-
scopic patterns arising from local of interaction of agents”.
only give two examples, see [HG93,Axt00]). However, what we advocate is a
(somewhat) more systematic approach, based on the following principles:
(i) Start with a ”base case“ result P , stated under a particular scheduling model.
(ii) Identify several structural properties of the scheduling model that impact the
validity of P . Ideally, these properties should be selected by careful exami-
nation of the proof of P , which should reveal their importance.
(iii) Identify those properties (or combinations of properties) that are neces-
sary/sufficient for the validity of P . Correspondingly, identify properties
that that are inconsequential to the validity of P .
(iv) The process outlined so far can continue by recursively applying steps (i)-
(iii). In the process we may need to reformulate the original statement in
a way that makes it hold under larger classes of schedulers, thus making it
more robust. The precise reformulation(s) normally arise from inspecting the
cases when the proof of P fails in an adversarial setting.
The intended benefits of the adversarial scheduling approach are multiple
(see [Ist06] for further discussions). The aim of this paper is to show that these
benefits do not come at the expense of mathematical tractability: at least for
one nontrivial dynamics, adversarial scheduling (as outlined in the five point
approach above) is feasible and can lead to interesting results.
2 Preliminaries
First we define two classes of graphs that we will frequently consider in this
paper. The line graph Ln, n ≥ 1 consists of n vertices v1, . . . vn and edges
(vi, vi+1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. We will use Line to denote the set of all line graphs.
A star graph Starn, n ≥ 1, is the complete bipartite graph K1,n. We will use
Star to denote the set of all star graphs.
2.1 Basic Model: Prisoner’s Dilemma with Pavlov dynamics
Next we describe the basic mathematical model for Prisoner’s Dilemma with
Pavlov dynamics; see [Kit94,MR06,DGG+02] for additional discussion. We are
given an undirected graph G(V,E), |V | = n and |E| = m. Each vertex v ∈ V
represents an agent. Each agent has a label from the set {0, 1}. These labels
denote the strategies that the players follow: 0 can also be equivalently viewed
as cooperation and 1 can be viewed as defection. Without loss of generality, we
assume that G is connected, otherwise the dynamics will reduce to independent
dynamics on the connected components of G. We will also assume that the graph
contains at least two edges.
Time will be discrete. At time t = 0 all nodes are assigned a label from {0, 1}.
At each subsequent step, certain nodes/agents change their label (strategy) ac-
cording to the rules given below. We will use xt(v) to denote the label of node
v. At each step t + 1 an edge e = (u, v) is selected according to some rule and
the states of u and v are updated as follows:
x(t+1)(u)← (xt(u) + xt(v)) (mod 2)
x(t+1)(v)← (xt(u) + xt(v)) (mod 2)
We will use Xt to denote the vector (xt(v1), . . . xt(vn)) representing the states of
the nodes v1, . . . vn. This will be sometimes referred to as the global configuration.
Sometime we will omit the subscript t for ease of exposition and its value will
be clear from context. With this terminology, each step of the dynamics can be
viewed as a global update function F . It takes as input an element e = (vi, vj) ∈
E, X = (x(v1), . . . x(vn)) and returns the next global Y = (y(v1), . . . y(vn))
given as follows: ∀vk, s.t. k 6= i and k 6= j, y(vk) = x(vk); and y(vi) = y(vj) =
(x(vi)+x(vj)) (mod 2). In this caseY is said to be reachable from X in one step.
A global configuration X is said to be a fixed point if ∀e ∈ E, F (X, e) = X.
It is easy to see the dynamical system studied here has a unique fixed point
0 = (0, . . . , 0). Following dynamical systems literature, a configuration X is
called a Garden of Eden configuration if the configuration is not reachable from
any other configuration. For the rest of this paper, we will use X,Y, . . . to
denote global configurations. An instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with Pavlov
dynamics (PDPD) can thus be represented as a (G, f), where G is the underlying
interaction graph and f is the local function associated with each node. In the
remainder of this paper, since f is always fixed, an instance will be specified
simply by G.
2.2 The base-case result
The following property of the PDPD is easily seen to hold under random match-
ing: for all interaction graphs G with no isolated vertices the system converges
with probability 1− o(1) to the “all zeros” configuration (henceforth denoted 0)
With a slight abuse of convention, we will refer to this event as self-stabilization.
This will the statement we will aim to study in an adversarial setting.
We will also be interested in the convergence time of the dynamics. Under
random scheduling Dyer et al. [DGG+02] prove that the number of steps needed
to self-stabilize is O(n logn) on Cn (the simple cycle on n nodes) and exponential
in n on Kn (the complete graph on n nodes). The convergence time was further
investigated by Mossel and Roch [MR06].
2.3 Types of scheduler
A schedule S is specified as an infinite string over E, i.e. S ∈ E∗. Given a schedule
S = (e1, e2, . . . , et, . . .), the graph G and an initial configuration I, the dynamics
of the system evolve as follows. At time t = 0 the system is in state I. At time
t, we pick the tth edge from S. Call this edge et. If the configuration at the
beginning of time t is X then the configuration Y at the beginning of time t+1
is given by Y ← F (X, et). The iterated global transition function F
∗ is defined
as
F ∗(I, (e1, e2, . . . , et, . . .)) ≡ F
∗(F (I, e1), (e2, . . . , et, . . .))
We say that a system G self stabilizes for a given initial configuration I
and a schedule S = (e1, . . . , et, . . .)
6 if ∃t ≥ 1 such that the system start-
ing in I reaches the (unique fixed point) configuration 0 after t time steps, i.e.
0 ← F (I, (e1, . . . , et)). G is said to self stabilize for a schedule S if G even-
tually reaches a fixed point when started at any initial configuration I, i.e.
∀I, F (I,S) → 0. Conversely, a schedule S can preclude self stabilization of
G if ∃I such that F (I, S) does not ever reach 0. Given a set of schedules, a
scheduler is simply an algorithm (possibly randomized) that chooses a schedule.
The schedulers considered here are all polynomial time algorithms and the set
of feasible schedules are described below.
Schedulers can be adaptive or non-adaptive. An adaptive scheduler decides
on the next edge or node based on the current global configuration. A non-
adaptive scheduler decides on a schedule in advance by looking at the graph (and
possibly the initial configuration). This schedule is then fixed for remainder of
the dynamic process. One particularly restricted class of non-adaptive schedules
is a fixed permutation of nodes/edges repeated periodically and independent of
the initial state of the system. For node updates, this is the model employed in
sequential dynamical systems [BHM+03,BEM05].
There are several distinctions that can be made, concerning the power of a
scheduler. The first one concerns the number of players that the scheduler is able
to choose. There are two possibilities.
– An edge-daemon (or edge-scheduler) is able to choose both players of the
interacting pair. In other words, an edge daemon constructs S by selecting
edges ei ∈ E in some order.
– A node-daemon (or node-scheduler) can choose only one of the players. We
can let this player choose its partner. A natural model is to consider the
case where partner is chosen uniformly at random among the neighbors of
the first player. In such a case, we say that the node-scheduler model has
random choice, or random-choice node-scheduler.
2.4 Summary of results
Our results can be summarized as follows:
– Not surprisingly, some amount of fairness is a necessary to extend self-
stabilization in an adversarial setting.
– The power given to the scheduler makes a big difference in whether or not
the system self stabilizes:
6 Note that ei and ej in the sequence need not be distinct
(i) if the scheduler can exogenously choose both participants in the game
then (Theorems 2,3) it can preclude convergence on most graphs, even
when bounded by fairness constraints.
(ii) On the other hand schedulers that allow a limited amount of endogeneity
in agent interactions7, by only choosing one of the participants are no
more powerful than the random scheduler (Theorem 4) when nonadap-
tive, and are not significantly more powerful (Theorem 5) when adaptive
but “reasonably fair”.
We also investigate experimentally (in Section 7) the convergence time of
the colearning dynamics for a few nonadaptive schedulers, in a case when the
convergence time for the random scheduler is known rigorously.
2.5 Related work
Our approach is naturally related to the theory of self-stabilization of distributed
systems [Dol00]. Multi-agent systems, like the ones considered in the evolutionary
game dynamics, have many of the characteristics of a distributed system: a num-
ber of entities (the agents) capable of performing certain computations (changing
their strategies) based on local information. Randomized models of this type (in-
cluding the model we study in this paper) have been in fact recently considered
in the context of self-stabilization [FMP05]. There are, however, a number of
differences. First, in self-stabilization the computational entities (processors) are
capable of executing a wide-range of activities (subject to certain constraints,
for example the requirement that all processors run the same program, in the
context of so-called uniform self-stabilizing systems). The goal of such systems
is to achieve a certain goal (legal state) in spite of transient errors and malicious
scheduling. In contrast, in our setup, there is no “goal”, the computations are
fixed, and restricted to steps of the evolutionary dynamics. The only source of
uncertainty arises from the scheduling model. A second difference is in the na-
ture of the update rule. Usually, in self-stabilizing systems there is a difference
between enabled processors, that intend to take a step, and those that indeed
take it. Such a notion is not so natural in the context of game-theoretic models.
As mentioned earlier, the dynamics, can be easily recast in the context of Pris-
oner’s Dilemma: let 1 encode “defection” and 0 encode “cooperation”. Then the
update rule corresponds to the so-called win-stay, lose-shift [Pos97], or Pavlov
strategy. This rule specifies that agents defect on the next move precisely when
the strategy they used in the last interaction was different from the strategy
used by the other player. It was the object of much attention in the context
of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [Axe84], [NS93],[Axe97]. Related versions of the
dynamics have an even longer history in the Psychology literature, where they
7 The importance of this property has been recognized [Vri06] in the agent-based
simulation literature
were proposed to model emergence of cooperation in situations where players do
not know precisely the payoffs of the game in which they are participating, and
might even be unaware they are playing a game: Sidowski [Sid57] has proposed
the “minimal social situation” (MSS), a two-person experiment representing an
extremely simple form of interaction between two agents. MSS was first viewed
as a game by Thibaut and Kelley [TK59] who called it “Mutual Fate Control”.
An explanation for the empirical observations in [TK59] was proposed by Kelley,
Thibaut, Radloff and Mundy [HKM62], that raised the possibility that players
were acting according to the Pavlov dynamics. MSS was generalized to mul-
tiplayer games by Colman et al. [ACT91,Col05], who obtained mathematical
characterization for the emergence of cooperation.
3 Fairness in scheduling
A necessary restriction on schedulers we will be concerned with is fairness. In
self-stabilization this is usually taken to mean that each node is updated infinitely
often in an infinite schedule. We will also consider notions of bounded fairness.
A natural definition is the following:
Definition 1. Let b ≥ 1. A scheduler that can choose one item among a set of
m elements is (worst-case) b-fair if for every agent x, no other agent is scheduled
more than b times between two consecutive times that x is scheduled.
It is easy to see that a 1-fair edge scheduler chooses a fixed permutation
of edges uses this as a periodic schedule. A 1-fair node daemon selects a fixed
permutation of nodes and for each node selects a random neighbor and repeats
the same permutation (with possibly different partners) periodically.
The fact that we want to investigate properties of the random scheduler
suggest investigating fairness of probabilistic schedulers. For such schedulers,
the worst-case fairness in Definition 1 is far too restrictive.
Definition 2. A probabilistic scheduler is weakly fair if for any node x and any
initial schedule y, the probability that x will eventually be scheduled, given that
the scheduler selected nodes according to y is positive.
The random scheduler is weakly fair. Not every scheduler is weakly fair, and
a scheduler need not be weakly fair to make the system self-stabilize. On the
other hand, the base-case result does not extend to the adversarial setting when
weak fairness is not required:
Theorem 1 The following are true:
(i) There exists an edge scheduler that is not weakly fair and that makes the
system self-stabilize no matter what its starting configuration is.
(ii) For any graph G there exists an edge/node scheduler that is not weakly fair
and that prevents the system from self-stabilizing on some initial configura-
tion.
Another restatement of Theorem 1 is that weak fairness is necessary to pre-
clude some ”degenerate“ schedulers like the ones we construct for the proof of
point (ii).
Proof. (i) Consider an edge scheduler that works as follows:
– Choose an edge e that has not yet self-stabilized, i.e. at least one of its
endpoints is 1.
– Turn nodes of e to 0 by playing e twice.
– The scheduler never schedules e subsequently.
(ii) Consider a node (edge) scheduler that repeatedly schedules the same node
(edge). It is easy to see that the system does not self-stabilize unless the
graph consists of a single edge (a star in the case of a node scheduler when
the center node is the scheduled one).
Definition 3. A probabilistic scheduler is O(f(n))-node fair w.h.p. if the fol-
lowing condition is satisfied while the system has not reached the fixed point: For
any schedule W (call its last scheduled node x), every node y and every ǫ > 0
there exists Cǫ > 0 such that, with probability at least 1 − ǫ node y will be
scheduled at most Cǫ · f(n) times before x is scheduled again..
A scheduler is boundedly node fair w.h.p. if it is O(f(n))-node fair w.h.p.
for some function f(n).
We emphasize the fact that Definition 2 applies to edge schedulers as well,
when a node x is considered to occur at stage t if some edge containing x is
scheduled at that step.
With these definitions we have:
Theorem 2 Let S be a (node or edge) weakly fair probabilistic scheduler such
that the following result holds: for any initial configuration, the probability that
the system self-stabilizes tends to one. Then the scheduler is boundedly node fair.
Proof. We will consider both node and edge schedulers at the same time. Let ǫ >
0 and let T = T (ǫ, n) be an integer such that, no matter in which configuration
S we start the system, the probability that the system does not self-stabilize
(taken over all the coin tosses of the scheduler) is at most ǫ.
Consider any state S of the system after a node x has be scheduled, and
assume that S is not the absorbing state 0. Run the system for T steps. The
probability that the system does not self-stabilize is at most ǫ. On the other
hand, if some node y is not played at all during the T steps then the system has
no chance to self-stabilize. It follows that the maximum number of times a given
node can be scheduled before x is scheduled again is at most T − 1.
4 The Power of Edge-Schedulers
From now on we will restrict ourselves to boundedly fair schedulers. This section
aims to show that edge-schedulers are too powerful. Indeed, it is easy to show
that there exist graphs on which even 1-fair edge-schedulers can prevent self-
stabilization. The following two results provide a modest improvement, showing
that even 2-fair edge-daemons on any graph are too strong :
Theorem 3 Let G be an instance of PDPD. Then there exists an initial con-
figuration I and a 2-fair edge-scheduler S that precludes self-stabilization on G
starting in configuration I.
Proof. Consider a sequence of edges e0, . . . ek (with repetitions allowed) such
that
– every edge of G appears in the list.
– for every i = 0, . . . , k, ei and ei+1 have exactly one vertex in common (where
ek+1 = e0).
– Every edge appears in the sequence at most twice.
We will show that an enumeration F (G) with these properties can be found
for any connected graph with more than one edge. Such a sequence specifies in a
natural (via its periodic extension) a 2-fair edge daemon. It is easy to see that the
only states that can lead to the fixed point are the fixed point and states leading
to it in one step: such a state has exactly two (adjacent) ones. But such a state
cannot be reached from any other state according to the previously described
scheduler, since the edge that would have been “touched” immediately before
has unequal labels on its extremities, which cannot be the case after updating
it.
We now have to show how to construct the enumeration F (G). First we give
the enumeration in the case graph G is a tree. In this case we perform a walk
on G, listing the edges as follows: suppose the root r is connected, via vertices
v1, . . . , vk to subtrees T1, . . . , Tk. Then define recursively
F (G) = (v, t1)F (T1)(t1, v)(v, t2)F (t2)(t2, v) . . . (tk−1, v)(v, tk)F (Tk)(tk, v), (1)
where, if the list of edges thus constructed contains two consecutive occur-
rences of the same edge we eliminate the second occurrence.
Consider now the general case of a connected graph G, and let S(G) be a
spanning tree in G. Edges of G belong to two categories:
(i) Edges of the spanning tree S(G).
(ii) Edges in E(G) \ E(S(G)).
Define F (G) as the list of edges obtained from F (S(G)) in the following
way: whenever F (S(G)) first touches a new vertex w in G insert the edges in
E(G) \ E(S(G)) adjacent to w (in some arbitrary order); continue then with
F (S(G)). It is easy to see that each edge e is listed at most twice in F (G). To
prove this consider the two cases, e ∈ E(S(G)) and e ∈ E(G) \ E(S(G)). The
statement follows in the first case by the recursive definition 1. In the second
case it follows by construction, since a nontree edge is visited only when one of
its endpoints is first touched in E(S(G)).
Even the most restricted edge-schedulers, 1-fair edge-schedulers, are able to
preclude self stabilization on a large class of graphs. To see that define
(i) G1 to be the class of graphs G that contain a cycle of length at least four.
(ii) G2 to be the class of graphs G that contain no cycles of length at least four
and m, the number of edges of G is even.
(iii) G3 to be the class of trees with n = 4k vertices.
Theorem 4 Let G be a connected graph in G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3. Then there exists an
initial configuration on G and a 1-fair edge-schedule S that is able to forever
preclude self-stabilization on G.
In other words, connected graphs for which the system self-stabilizes for all
1-fair schedulers have an odd number of edges and all their cycles (if any) have
length 3.
Proof. Define ∆i,j = (d
(i,j)
k,l ) a n× n matrix over Z2 by
d
(i,j)
k,l =
{
1 , if (k, l) = (i, j)
0 , otherwise.
(2)
Suppose we represent configurations of the system as vectors in Zn2 .
Taking one step of the dynamics on an arbitrary configuration X with the
scheduled edge being (i, j) leads to configuration X = Ai,j · X, where matrix
Ai,j is given by
Ai,j = In +∆i,j +∆j,i. (3)
Indeed, the only nondiagonal elements of matrix Ai,j that are nonzero are in
positions (i, j) and (j, i). This means that all elements of a configuration X in
positions other than i, j are preserved under multiplication with Ai,j . It is easy
to see that labels in positions i, j change according to the specified dynamics.
Consider a graphG withm edges, E(G) = {(i1, j1), . . . , (im, jm)}. The action
of a 1-fair edge schedule S (specified by permutation π of {1, . . . ,m}) on a
configuration X corresponds to multiplication of X by
π(S) = Aipi[1],jpi[1] · Aipi[2],jpi[2] · . . . ·Aipi[m],jpi[m] . (4)
An edge-schedule cannot prevent self-stabilization implies that starting at
any initial configuration, the system reaches a fixed point. In other words, ∀I ∈
Zn2 ∃k ∈ N s.t.[π(S)]
k · I = 0. Since the number of vectors I is finite, this is
equivalent to saying that ∃k1 ∈ N, ∀I, [π(S)]
k1 ·X = 0. Equivalently this means
that [π(S)]k = 0, i.e. matrix π[S] is nilpotent. Thus, what we want to show is
Lemma 4. For any graph G there exists a schedule S such that the correspond-
ing matrix π[S] is not nilpotent.
Consider now an arbitrary ordering of vertices in G and let π be the permu-
tation corresponding to the induced lexicographic ordering of edges of G (where
an edge is seen as an ordered pair, with the vertex of lower index appearing
first).
It is easy to see that
∆i,j ·∆k,l =
{
∆i,l , if j = k
0 , otherwise.
(5)
Indeed, if∆i,j = (a
(i,j)
m,n )m,n≥1, then the only wat for some element cm,n of the
product ∆i,j ·∆k,l to be nonzero is that there exists at least one term d
(i,j)
m,p ·d
(k,l)
p,n
that is nonzero. But this is only possible for (i, j) = (m, p) and (p, n) = (k, l),
in other words for m = i, n = l and p = j = k, which immediately yields
equation (5).
Let us now consider the integer matrix Π [S] obtained by interpreting equa-
tions (3) and (4) as equations over integers. Because integer addition and multi-
plication commute with taking the modulo 2 value, matrix π[S] can be obtained
by applying reduction modulo 2 to every element of Π [S].
Let Pi,j = ∆i,j + ∆j,i. From the definition of matrix π(S) in equation (4)
and the definition of matrices Ai,j in equation ( 3) we see that π[S] is a sum of
products, each term in a product corresponding to either a Pi,j or to the identity
matrix. Thus
Π [S] = I +
∑
∅6=S⊆{1,...,m}
(
∏
k∈S
Pipi[k],jpi[k]). (6)
Consider the directed graph G obtained from G by duplicating every edge
{i, j} of G into two directed edges (i, j), (j, i) in G. Label every edge e ∈ E(G) by
the (unique) integer k such that e = {iπ[k], jπ[k]}, and apply the same labelling to
the two oriented versions of edge e in G. Then equation (5) shows that nonzero
products of matrices∆ are in bijective correspondence to directed paths of length
two with increasing labels, when read from the starting to the end node of
the path. Inductively generalizing these observations to all sets S we see that
products in (6) are nonzero exactly when they specify a directed path in G (i.e.
a path in G) from a vertex k to a vertex l with increasing labels when read from
k to l, in which case they are equal to ∆k,l.
Therefore Π [S] = I + C, where C = (ci,j) is given by
ci,j =
{
# of paths from i to j with increasing labels, if such paths exist
0, otherwise.
(7)
The matrix π[S] is, of course, obtained by reducing modulo 2 the elements
of Π [S]. A well known result in linear algebra8 is that the the characteristic
polynomial of a nonzero nilpotent matrixA is xn. Thus, one strategy to show that
a given matrix π[S] is not nilpotent is to make sure that for some p, 0 ≤ p ≤ n,
the sum sp of its principal minors of order p is non-zero. This is equivalent to
making sure that the sum of the corresponding minors of the associated integer
matrix is odd. The proof consists of three cases:
Case (a) G ∈ G1: We will prove the following
Lemma 5. There exist two permutations σ1 and σ2 with corresponding matrices
over integers A1 = Π [σ1] and A2 = Π [σ2] such that
trace(A2) ≡ (trace(A1) + 1)(mod 2).
Given Lemma 4, the proof of Lemma 3 for Case (a) follows since matrices
π[σ1] and π[σ2] cannot both be nilpotent. This is true since the trace(A1) and
trace(A2) have different parities. We will prove Lemma 4 using a multistep
argument, combining the conclusions of Lemmas 3-5 below. Consider first the
following “basic” graphs: K4, K3 △ K3 (the graph obtained by merging two
triangles on a common edge), and Cn, n ≥ 4.
Lemma 6. The conclusion of Lemma 4 is valid for the “basic” graphs.
Proof. By the previous result on the value of coefficients ci,j the value of the
trace of a matrix A can be easily computed from the number of cycles with
increasing labels. Also, note the following:
– Any cycle C contributes a one to at most one ci,i, for some vertex i appearing
in C. This is because of the restriction on the increasing labels, who might
be verified for at most one node of the cycle.
– Moreover, any triangle contributes a 1 to exactly one ci,i. Therefore, in con-
sidering the trace of matrix A triangles add the same quantity irrespective
of permutation, and can thus be ignored.
This observation leads to a simple solution when the underlying graph is a
simple cycle Cn, n ≥ 4, or the graph K3 △K3. Note that these graphs contain
a unique cycle C of length atleast 4. Consider an ordering of the edges of this
cycle, corresponding to moving around the cycle. We will create two labellings
8 justified as follows: a classical result states that the characteristic and the minimal
polynomial of a matrix have the same roots (with different multiplicities). But it is
easy to see that the minimal polynomial of a nilpotent matrix is xk for some k ≤ n.
corresponding to this ordering. The first one assigns labels 1 to |C| in this order.
The other labelling assigns labels 1, 2, . . . , |C| − 2, |C|, |C| − 1 in this order. It
is easy to see that the first ordering contributes a 1 to exactly one diagnonal
element, while the second one does not contribute a 1 to any element. Hence the
traces of the corresponding matrices differ by exactly 1.
For graph K4 we first label the diagonal edges by 5 and 6. There are three
cycles of length 4 in the graph K4 – one that uses no diagonal edges, the other
two using them both. For the outer cycle consisting of no diagonal edges, we
consider the two orderings described in the previous case on the outer cycle C4.
This as before shows that the traces of the corresponding matrices differe exactly
by 1. Next, note that irrespective of the labelling of the non-diagonal edges, the
two cycles containing the diagonal edges cannot be traversed in increasing label
order, so they do not contribute to the trace of the associated matrix. Therefore,
the result follows for graph K4 as well. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 7. Let G be a graph and let G2 be a subgraph of G induced by a subset
of the vertices in G. If the conclusion of Lemma 3 holds for G2, then it holds for
G.
Proof. Extend a permutation of the edges in G2 to a permutation of the edges
in G via a fixed labelling of the edges in E(G) \ E(G2) such that
(i) The index of any edge with both ends in G2 is strictly smaller than the index
of all edges not in this class.
(ii) The index of any edge with exactly one end in G2 is strictly larger than the
index of any edge not in this class.
The trace of the resulting matrix is determined by the cycles with strictly
increasing labels. There are several types of such cycles:
(i) Cycles in G \G2. Whether such a cycle can be traversed in increasing label
order does not depend on the precise labelling on edges of G2 as long as the
conditions of the extension are those described before.
(ii) Cycles containing some edges in G2, as well as additional edges from G\G2.
Because of the restriction we placed on the labelings, the only such cycles
that can have increasing labels are the triangles with two vertices in G2 and
one vertex in G \G2. Since there exist an unique way to “read” a triangle in
the increasing order of the edge labels, their contribution to the total trace
is equal to the number of such triangles, and does not depend on the precise
labeling of edges in G2, as long as the restriction of the labeling is met.
(iii) Cycles entirely contained in G2.
Let now σ1, σ2 be labelings on G2 verifying the conclusion of Lemma 2 and
σ1, σ2 extensions to G verifying the stated restriction. The conclusion of the pre-
vious analysis analysis is that a difference in the parity of the traces of matrices
corresponding to the labelings σi on G2 directly translates into a difference in
the parity of the traces of matrices corresponding to labelings σi on G.
Finally, we reduce the case of a general graph to that of a base case graph
via the following result.
Lemma 8. Let G be a graph that contains a cycle of length ≥ 4 and is minimal
(any induced subgraph H does not contain a cycle of length ≥ 4 any more). Then
G is one of the “basic” graphs from Lemma 3.
Proof. Let G be minimal with the property that it contains a cycle of length
≥ 4, let n be the number of nodes in G and let C be a cycle of length ≥ 4 in G.
Because of minimality, C contains all the vertices of G (otherwise G would not
be minimal, since one could eliminate nodes outside C). Thus C is a Hamiltonian
cycle. If no other edge is present then we get the cycle Cn. Moreover, no other
edge can be present unless n = 4 (otherwise G would contain a smaller cycle of
length ≥ 4 and thus would not be minimal). In this case the two possibilities are
K4 and K3 △K3.
Case (b) G ∈ G2: Consider the ordering <sum on the edges of G so that
{i, j} <sum {k, l} when either
i+ j < k + l
or
i+ j = k + l and min{i, j} < min{k, l}.
In this case ck,k = 0 for every k, except when k is the middle-index vertex of
a triangle (i.e. a triangle with vertex labels i, j, k such that i < k < j).
We infer that s1 = trace(A) is congruent (mod 2) to n plus the number of
triangles in G, that is to m+1 (mod 2) (where m is the number of edges of G).
Case (c) G ∈ G3: Consider the sum s2 of principal minors of size 2 of A. In
a tree there can be at most one path between two nodes. Since we are counting
paths with increasing labels, the only way for ai,j = aj,i = 1 to hold is that
vertices i and j be adjacent. But in this case the corresponding minor is zero. It
follows that s2 is the number of sets of different nonadjacent vertices in G, that
is
s2 =
(
n
2
)
− (n− 1) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)
2
= 1 mod 2
if n = 4k.
One might suspect that Theorem 2 (ii) extends to all graphs, thus strenght-
ening the statement of Theorem 1 to 1-fair daemons. This is not the case: Let
the line graph L6 be an instance of PDPD. Then for all 1-fair edge-schedulers
S and for all initial configurations I the system self-stabilizes starting at I. We
verified this statement via computer simulation, by running PDPD for all 6!
1-fair daemons. A result that rendered this experiment computationally feasible
is the state-reduction technique highlighted in the proof of (ii): to prove self-
stabilization we only needed to consider those initial configurations with exactly
one 1. Thus we had to run 6 × 6! simulations. It is an open problem to find all
graphs for which this happens. However, Theorem 2 (ii) shows that the class of
such graphs is really limited.
5 Nonadaptive node-schedulers
As we saw, even 1-fair edge schedulers are able to prevent self-stabilization. What
if we only allow the scheduler to choose one of the nodes ? In this section we
study the Prisoners dilemma with Pavlov dynamics when adversaries are 1-fair
node-schedulers. Because only one of the nodes of the scheduled edge is chosen
by the adversary and the other one is chosen randomly, the self-stabilization of
the system is a stochastic event.
Theorem 5 Let Starn be an instance of PDPD. Then Sn self-stabilizes with
probability 1 against any 1-fair scheduler.
Proof. One can assume, without loss of generality, that the first node to be
scheduled is the center (labeled 0) and the rest of the nodes are scheduled in the
order 1, 2, . . . , n. Indeed, if the center was scheduled later in the permutation
of nodes, it is enough to prove self-stabilization from the configuration that
corresponds to first running the system up to just before the center is scheduled,
and then viewing the run as initialized at the new configuration, and with a new
periodic schedule (that now starts with node 0). As for the order in which the
other nodes get scheduled, by relabelling the nodes we may assume without loss
of generality that this is 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let a0, a1, . . . , an be the labels of nodes at the beginning of the process. It
is useful to first consider a deterministic version of the dynamics in question,
specified as a game between two players
– The first player is choosing one node to be scheduled. It is required that the
sequence of nodes chosen by this player forms a periodic sequence π. The
goal of the first player is to prevent self-stabilization.
– Given a node choice by the first player, the second player is responding with
a choice of the second node to be scheduled. Unlike the first player, the
sequence of nodes chosen by the second player can potentially vary between
successive repetitions of the permutation π. The goal of the second player is
to make the system converge to state 0.
The game above is an example of the scheduler-luck games from the self-
stabilization literature [DIM95]. We will provide a strategy for the second player
that (when applied) will turn any configuration into the “all zeros” configuration.
But a winning strategy for the second player in the scheduler-luck game will
be played with positive probability in any round of the scheduler. Thus with
probability going to one (as the number of rounds goes to infinity) this strategy
will be played at least in one round, making the system converge to state 0.
The crux of the strategy is to carefully use the “partner node” of node 0,
when this is scheduled, to create a segment of nodes 1, 2, . . . i (with i nondecreas-
ing, and eventually reaching n) with labels zero at the beginning of a round of
scheduling.
This is simple to do at the very beginning: if node 0 plays node 1 (when 0 is
scheduled), then the labels of the two node will be identical, thus when node 1
is scheduled (and plays again node 0) the label of node 1 will be zero.
If at the beginning of a round the label of node 0 is 1, we make it play (when
scheduled at the beginning of a round) the node of smallest positive index (i+1)
still labelled 1. This will turn the labels of both nodes to 0. Further scheduling
of nodes 1 to i+ 1 will not change this, and at the end of the round, nodes 1 to
i+ 1 will still be labelled 0.
If, on the other hand at the beginning of the round node 0 is labelled 0, we
make it keep this label (and, thus, not affect the zero labels of nodes 1 to 1) by
making it play (when scheduled) against another node labelled 0 (say node 1).
To complete the argument it remains to show that for any configuration
x0, . . . xn different from the “all zeros” configuration, in a finite number of rounds
we will reach a configuration where the first case applies, and thus the length of
the “all zero” initial segment increases.
Indeed, assume that x(0) = 0 and it stays that way throughout the process.
Then, denoting by Yt = (x(1)t, . . . x(n)t)
T the labels of the nodes 1 to n at the
beginning of the t’th round, it is easy to see that the dynamics of the system is
described by the recurrence
Yt+1 = B · Yt,
with B = (bi,j) is a matrix of order n over Z2 specified by
bi,j =
{
1 , if i ≥ j
0 , otherwise.
Consider now B as a matrix over Z, rather than Z2. It is immediate to show
by induction that Bk = (b
(k)
i,j ) given by
b
(k)
i,j =
{(
i−j+k−1
k−1
)
, if i ≥ j
0 , otherwise.
The k’th power over Z2 is obtained, of course, by reducing these values mod
2. In particular define St to be the sum x(1)t + . . . x(n)t. It is easy to see that
St = x(0)t+1 thus by our hypothesis St has to be zero. On the other hand a
consequence of the previous result is that
St =
[
n∑
i=1
(
n− i+ t− 1
t− 1
)
· xi
]
( mod 2).
In particular
∆xt := St+1 − St =
[
n−1∑
i=1
(
n− i+ t− 1
t
)
· xi
]
( mod 2).
By induction and algebraic manipulation we generalize this to higher order
of iterated differences ∆kxt = ∆(∆
k−1xt) as:
∆kxt =
[
n−k∑
i=1
(
n− i+ t− 1
t+ k − 1
)
· xi
]
(mod 2).
Let i0 be the smallest index such that x(i0) = 1. Then, by the previous
relation
∆n−i0xt =
[
i0∑
i=1
(
n− i+ t− 1
t+ k − 1
)
xi
]
=
(
n− i0 + t− 1
n− i0 + t− 1
)
·xi0 = xi0 = 1 (mod 2).
But this contradicts the fact that St = 0 for every value of t and completes
the proof.
A 1-adaptive scheduler keeps repeating the nodes to choose according to a
fixed permutation. Thus, for a fixed scheduler and interaction graph we can talk
about the probability of stabilization in the limit. Also, for a given fixed sched-
uler, the event that this limit is one is a deterministic statement. Consequently
we can talk of the probability that this event happens when the interaction graph
is sampled from a class of random graphs. As noted, for a random scheduler the
condition that G has no isolated vertices is necessary and sufficient to guarantee
self-stabilization with probability 1. This is also true for the adversarial model
in the case of non-adaptive (1-fair) daemons. This is in case with the case of an
edge daemon, when even non-adaptive daemons could preclude stabilization.
Theorem 6 Let G be an instance of PDPD such that G has no isolated vertices.
Then for any 1-fair node-scheduler and any initial configuration the system G
reaches state 0 with probability 1.
The results of Theorem 5 should be contrasted with the corresponding result
for edge schedulers, for which, as we showed, even non-adaptive daemons could
preclude stabilization.
The proof consists of the following three components:
(i) our earlier result that guarantees a winning strategy for scheduler-luck game
associated to the dynamics when the underlying graph is Sn,
(ii) the partition of a spanning forest of G into node disjoint stars and
(iii) the fact that the existence of such a winning strategy is a monotone graph
property w.r.t to edge insertions. This is formally stated in the following
Lemma 9. Suppose H is a graph such that a winning strategy W exists for the
scheduler-luck game on a graph H. Let e 6∈ E(H), and let L = H ∪ {e}. Then
W is also a winning strategy for any graph L.
Proof. Given any node choice by the first player, the second player can choose
the corresponding node according to strategy W (thus never scheduling the
additional edge e). The outcome of the game is, therefore, identical on H and L.
Proof of Theorem 5. By Lemma 6 it is enough to show the existence of a
winning strategy for the second player in the scheduler-luck game on a graph G,
when G is a tree. We decompose tree G into a set {S1, . . . , Sp} of node-disjoint
stars as follows.
– Root G at an arbitrary node r.
– Consider the star formed by the root and its children. Call it S1.
– Remove the nodes in S1 and all edges with one end point incident on nodes
in S1
– Recursively apply the procedure on each forest created by the above opera-
tion.
Now consider a 1-fair schedule π on graph G, corresponding to a strategy of
the first player in the schedule-luck game on G. For every star Si, the projection
πi of the schedule on the nodes of Si (that amounts to only considering scheduled
nodes that belong to Si) specifies a 1-fair schedule on Si. According to Theorem
5, the second player has a winning strategy Wi for the scheduler-luck game on
Si when the first player acts according to the schedule πi.
Next, we devise a strategy W for the scheduler-luck game on graph G, by
by “composing” the winning strategies Wi. Specifically if the node chosen by
the first player belongs to star S, strategy W will employ Wi to choose the
corresponding second node. Since on each star Si the labels of the node will
eventually be 0, W is a winning strategy for the second player in the scheduler-
luck game on G.
6 Adaptive node schedulers
Nonadaptive schedulers could not preclude self-stabilization. In contrast, as the
following theorem shows, 3-fair nonadaptive node-schedulers are still powerful
enough to preclude self-stabilization with complete certainty, and so are 2-fair
adaptive9 schedulers.
Theorem 7 The following are true:
(i) Let the star graph Sn (K1,n) be an instance of PDPD. Then there exists
an initial configuration I and a 3-fair nonadaptive scheduler that precludes
self-stabilization on Starn starting in I.
(ii) Let the triangle K3 be an instance of PDPD. Then there exists an initial con-
figuration I and a 2-fair adaptive scheduler that precludes self-stabilization
on K3 starting in I.
9 obviously, there are no 1-fair adaptive schedulers.
Proof. (i) Consider the star graph Sn (K1,n), with the center labeled 0 and the
rest of the nodes labeled 1, 2, . . . , n. We have to provide an example of a 3-fair
scheduler that precludes self-stabilization on some initial configuration. This
initial configuration has two 1’s, at nodes 1 and 2. The scheduler repeats the
schedule [0, 1, 1, 3, 4, . . . n − 2, 2, 1, n− 1, n − 1]. After the scheduling of 0 1
1 the effect is that both nodes have label 0. Thus the scheduling of nodes
3, 4, . . . , n − 2 does not change any label. With node 2 the label of node 0
will change to 1, thus changing in the next step the label of node 1 back to
1. Finally scheduling the node n− 1 twice turns back the label of node 0 to
0, thus yielding the initial configuration. It is easy to see that the scheduler
is 3-fair.
(ii) Start with configuration I consisting of all ones. The scheduler will adap-
tively schedule the nodes, in sequences of three, so that at the end of such
a 3-block the system is guaranteed to be in configuration I again. Figure 1
describes the strategy of the scheduler, assuming that node 1 is scheduled
first.
111111[1]
001[3]
010[2]
101[2]
011[1]
110[3]
2
3
3
1
2,3
1
2
1,3
1,2
Fig. 1. A round of the 2-fair adaptive scheduler
Elements in the rectangle represent the state of the system, followed by the
scheduled node (in square brackets). choices. Labels on the edges represent
the possible probabilistic choices of the partner node, with multiple (inconse-
quential) choices separated by a comma. Note that the scheduler has similar
strategies if one of the nodes 2,3 is scheduled first. Also, note that a 3-block
consists of either a permutation of a node, or two nodes, with the initial and
the final node in the block being identical. The scheduler proceeds now to
create an infinite schedule consisting of 3-blocks according to the following
rule:
(a) If a given block B is a permutation then start the next block with the
same starting element as B.
(b) Otherwise if the given block B is missing node z, start the next block
by first scheduling z.
It is easy to see that the scheduler we constructed is 2-adaptive and precludes
self-stabilization.
Although formal definition of the probability of self-stabilization is more
complicated in this case, we can talk of the probability of self-stabilization for
adaptive daemons as well. However, as we have seen, the result of Theorem 5 is
no longer true: on stars, 1-fairness is stronger than 2-fair adaptive scheduling.
It would seem that this result shows that nonadaptiveness is important for self-
stabilization. However, we will see that the class of network topologies where
this happens is reasonably limited. Indeed, we next study self-stabilization on
Erdo˝s-Renyi random graphs G(n, p). We will choose p in such a way that with
high probability a random sample from G(n, p) has no isolated vertices10. In
other words, we require that necessary condition on the topology of G holds
with probability 1 − o(1). Call a graph G to be good if for any scheduler of
bounded fairness and any starting configuration I, G starting at I converges to
0 with probability 1− o(1), as the number of steps goes to infinity.
Theorem 8 Let p be s.t. np − logn → ∞. Then with probability 1 − o(1) a
random graph G ∈ G(n, p) is good.
Of course, a natural question is whether such a weakening of the original
result, from any graph topology satisfying a given condition to a generic random
graph satisfying the same condition, is reasonable. We are, however, not the
first ones to propose such an approach. Indeed, except for a handful of cases the
network that a given social dynamics takes place on is not known in its entirety.
Instead, a lot of recent work (see e.g. [PSV07,NBW06,Dur06] for presentations)
has resorted to the study of generic properties of random network models that
share some of the observable properties of a fixed network (such as the Internet
or the World Wide Web.
Proof. The plan of the proof is similar to that for 1-fair schedulers. Define a
round of a b-fair scheduler to consist of a consecutive sequence of b(n− 1) + 1
steps.
(i) We prove that for graphs from a class B of “base case” graphs (Lemma 7
below) the second player has a winning strategy in the scheduler-luck game
associated to any scheduler of bounded fairness, where the games corresponds
to a finite number of rounds of the scheduler.
(ii) We use the monotonicity of the existence of a strategy.
10 A random sample from G(n, p) has no isolated vertices with probability 1 − o(1)
when [JLR00] np− log n→∞.
(iii) We show that with probability 1 − o(1) the vertices of a random sample
graph G from the graph process can be partitioned such that all the induced
subgraphs are isomorphic with one graph in G.
Lemma 10. The following are true:
(i) Let G be a graph with a perfect matching. Then for any scheduler S of
bounded fairness, and any initial configuration on G, the second player has
a winning strategy for the scheduler-luck game corresponding to one round
of the scheduler.
(ii) Let the line Ln, n ≥ 6 be an instance of PDPD. Then for any node-scheduler
S of bounded fairness and every initial configuration I, the second player has
a winning strategy in the scheduler-luck game associated with two consecutive
rounds of S.
Proof. (i) A perfect matchingM ofG specifies a winning strategy in a scheduler-
luck game: each node plays (when scheduled) against its partner inM . Since
every node is scheduled at least once in a round of scheduling, every edge of
M is played at least twice. Therefore, irrespective of the initial configuration,
the final configuration is 0.
(ii) The lemma only needs to be proved in the case when n is odd (in the
other case the strategy based on perfect matchings applies). In this case
the winning strategy is specified as follows:
(a) In the first round turn the leftmost L4 portion of Ln into the all zero
state by playing the matching based winning strategy.
(b) In the second round nodes in the leftmost L3 will only choose to play
against each other when scheduled, thus remaining at 0. The remaining
nodes form a graph isomorphic to Ln−3, and in this round we use the
perfect matching based strategy for this graph.
We now note now that the statement of Lemma 6 extends to scheduler-luck
games associated to node daemons of bounded fairness. The proof is similar (a
strategy for the game on G is also a strategy for the game on a graph with a
larger set of edges). Theorem 7 immediately follows if n is even: a classical result
in random graph theory (see e.g. [JLR00] pp. 82-85) asserts that with probability
1− o(1) G will have a perfect matching.
To complete the proof of Theorem 7 we only need to deal with the case when
n is odd. For a graph G and a set of vertices V denote by G|V the subgraph
induced by vertex set V .
Lemma 11. With probability 1 − o(1) G can be partitioned into V = V1 ∪ V2
such that:
(i) G|V1 contains L7 as an edge-induced subgraph.
(ii) G|V2 is a graph with a perfect matching.
Theorem 7 follows from Lemma 8, since for both G|V1 and G|V2 the second
player has a winning strategy in the scheduler-luck game. A winning strategy for
the corresponding game on G proceeds by using the winning strategy for G|V1 ,
when the scheduled node is in V1 and the winning strategy for G|V2 when the
scheduled node is in V2.
The proof of Lemma 8 goes along lines similar to that of the proof of the
existence of a perfect matching in a random grapg(see [JLR00] pp. 82-85). The
first step is to show that w.h.p. G does not contain a set of distinct vertices
x0, x1, x2, x3, x4 such that:
– degG(x0) = degG(x4) = 1.
– For every i = 0, 3, xi and xi+1 are adjacent.
This is easy to see, since the expected number of such structures is O(n5p4(1−
p)2(n−1)) = O(n5p4e−2np) = o(1), since p = Θ( log(n)
n
).
Consider now a random graph G, conditioned on not containing such a struc-
ture, and a vertex x0 in G of degree one. Since this information only exposes
information on the edges with one endpoint at x0, with probability 1 − o(1)
graph H = G \ {x0} has a perfect matching. Let x1 be the node in G \ {x0}
adjacent to x0, and let x2 be the node matched to x1 in H . With probability
1− o(1) x2 has another neighbor x3 in H , (otherwise G would contain a cherry,
i.e. two vertices of degree one at distance exactly 2 in G (see Figure 2). But (see
[JLR00] pp. 86) a random sample from G(n, p) only contains a cherry with prob-
ability o(1). Let x4 be the node x3 is matched to in H . Again, with probability
1− o(1) x4 has a neighbor x5 in H different from x3 (otherwise the five vertices
x0 to x4 would form a structure we have conditioned on not occurring in G).
Finally let x6 be the node matched to x5 in H . Then the restriction of G to the
set V1 = {x0, . . . , x6} contains a copy of L7, and G restricted to V2 = V \ V1
contains a perfect matching (induced by the perfect matching on H).
Fig. 2. A cherry in a graph (with bold lines)
7 Speed of convergence
The previous theorems have shown that results concerning convergence to a fixed
point can be studied in (and extend to) an adversarial framework. Perhaps what
is not preserved as well in the adversarial framework is results on the computa-
tional efficiency of convergence to equilibrium. Such results include, for instance,
the above mentioned O(n logn) bound of [DGG+02]. The proof of this theorem
displays an interesting variation on the idea of a potential function. It uses such
a function, but in this case the value of the function only diminishes “on the av-
erage”, rather than for every possible move. Therefore bounding the convergence
time seems to critically use the “global” randomness introduced in the dynamics
by random matching, and does not trivially extend to adversarial versions. On
the other hand, the proof of Theorem 4 only guarantees an exponential upper
bound on expected convergence time.
We have investigated experimentally the convergence time on Cn for some
classes of 1-fair schedulers (permutations). Some of our results are presented
in Figure 3, where we present the average number of rounds, rather than steps,
over 1000 samples at each point. The symbol id denotes the identity permutation
(12 . . . n), p3 is the permutation σ[i] = 3i(mod n), (13) refers to permutations
with pattern (13245768 . . .), and rd refers to the maximum average number of
rounds, taken over 10 random permutations. In all cases the convergence time is
consistent with the above-mentioned O(n log n) result.
pi|n 4 8 16 32 64 128
id 2.486 4.225 6.401 8.33 10.498 13.135
p3 2.469 4.039 5.807 7.662 9.639 11.718
rd 2.289 4.499 6.527 8.781 11.161 14.151
(13) 2.168 4.656 7.069 9.837 12.653 14.859
pi|n 256 512 1024
id 16.091 17.954 20.331
p3 14.323 16.054 19.826
rd 17.342 20.518 22.336
(13) 18.504 20.346 20.392
Fig. 3. Rounds on Cn under 1-fair scheduling.
We are unable to obtain such a result (and leave it as an interesting open
problem)11. It is even more interesting to study the dependency of the mixing
time of the dynamics [DGG+02] on the underlying network topology. While
there are superficial reasons for optimism (for some models in evolutionary game
theory, e.g. [Mor00], the impact of network topology on the convergence speed
11 A promising approach is outlined in [FM05]
of a given dynamics is reasonably well understood), the reader is directed to
[MR06] (especially the concluding remarks) for a discussion on the difficulties
of connecting network topology and convergence speed for the specific dynamics
we study.
8 Discussion of Results and Conclusions
We have advocated the study of evolutionary game-theoretic models under ad-
versarial scheduling, similar to the ones in the theory of self-stabilization. As an
illustration we studied the Iterated Prisoners’Dilemma with the win-stay lose-
shift strategy.
Our results are an illustration of the adversarial approach as follows:
(i) Start with some result P , valid under random scheduling. The orig-
inal statement is presented in Subsection 2.2.
(ii) Identify several structural properties of a random scheduler that
impact the validity of P . The random scheduler is
– fairmore preciselyO(n log n) fair w.h.p. by the Coupon Collector Lemma.
– endogeneous, since the next edge to be scheduled is not fixed in advance.
– nonadaptive, since the next edge to be scheduled does not depend on the
configuration of the system.
(iii) Identify those properties (or combinations of properties) that are
necessary/sufficient for the validity of P .
Theorem 1 shows that fairness is a necessary condition for the extension of
the original result to adversarial settings. Next, the definition of node and
edge schedulers illustrates another important property of random schedulers:
endogeneity of agent interactions: an edge scheduler completely specifies the
dynamics of interaction. In contrast, node schedulers provide perhaps the
weakest possible form of endogeneity: the underlying social network is still
fixed, but the agents can choose a neigbor among his neighbors to interact
with (or simply play a random one).
Theorems 4 and 5 show that, in contrast with the case of edge schedulers,
even this limited amount of endogeneity is sufficient to recover the original
result for random scheduler. Moreover, the proofs illuminate the role of en-
dogeneity, that was somehat obscured in the (trivial) original proof that the
Pavlov dynamics (under random matching) converges with high probability
to the “all zeros” fixed-point. This proof implicitly relies on the fact that
from every state there exists a sequence of “right” moves, that “funnels” the
system towards the fixed point. For node schedulers the existence of a such
a set of right moves is proved by explicit construction and is more difficult
in the adversarial setting. The existence of such a set of moves is precisely
what exogeneous choice of agents is able to preclude.
(iv) Correspondingly, identify those properties that are inessential to
the validity of P . In the process one can reformulate (if needed)
the original statement in a way that makes it more robust.
Theorem 6 shows that, if we allow schedulers to be adaptive, then net-
work topology becomes important, and can invalidate the original result in
an adversarial setting. However adaptiveness (or, equivalently, the amount of
fairness) is inesential if we require the convergence result to only hold generi-
cally with respect to the class of network topologies described by Erdo˝s-Renyi
random graphs.
The results we proved also highlight a number of techniques from the theory
of self-stabilization that might be useful in developing a general theory:
– the concept of scheduler-luck game.
– composition of strategies by partitioning the interaction topology.
– monotonicity and “generic preservation” via threshold properties.
Obviously, a reconsideration of more central game-theoretic models under
adversarial scheduling is required (and would be quite interesting).
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